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Abstract The current study sought to examine the impact of
incidental activation defined as arousal and subjective signif-
icance, both represented in connotations of verbal materials,
on social perception of unknown and thus ambiguous objects,
in terms of two basic dimensions of social cognition: warmth
and competence. Arousal was expected to promote interpre-
tation of ambiguous stimuli in terms of warmth, while subjec-
tive significance in terms of competence. This means that both
activation and social perception may be treated as examples
dual-mind systems functioning. Sixty participants (30 wom-
en) were exposed to two subsequent tasks. The first involved
memorizing 135 words (manipulation prepared in a factorial
design contrasting 3 levels of arousal and 3 levels of subjective
significance), and the second involved guessing the meaning
of hexagram stimuli derived from Far East culture. An increas-
ing level of arousal caused participants to interpret stimuli as
increasingly related to warmth, while an increasing level of
subjective significance led to interpretations more related to
competence. This study shows that two distinct types of acti-
vation may trigger different interpretations of social stimuli,
which means that there is a link between both types of pro-
cesses. This finding is of great importance for the dual-mind
approach, showing that a multitude of dualities indentified
thus far may be related one another. Therefore, it is justified
to treat them as emanations of more general mental systems.
Keywords Social cognition . Ambiguous task processing .
Priming effect . Duality ofmind
Introduction
When thinking about the mind, the crucial issue is to under-
stand the mechanisms of its functioning, because this may
provide a chance to predict the consequences of certain events,
including social ones. This paper aims to search for the con-
sequences of incidental activation for the perception of other
people, in terms of two fundamental dimensions of warmth
and competence (Fiske et al. 2007; Wojciszke 2005). The
theoretical foundation for this study was the dual-processes
theory framework (e.g. Epstein 2003; Kahneman 2011) ac-
counting for a huge variety of social processes (Gawronski
and Creighton 2013).
Dual Systems of Mind and Their Activation
Mechanisms
Among dual-processes theories, distinguishing between auto-
matic vs. controlled processing modes (e.g. Bargh et al. 1996;
Gawronski and Creighton 2013; Kahneman 2011; Strack and
Deutsch 2004), there are domain specific models of function-
ing, like decision-making (e.g., Slovic et al. 2002), reasoning
(e.g., Darlow and Sloman 2010) or judging (Lieberman 2003),
as well as more general views on how the mind works in
different aspects of functioning (c.f. Epstein 2003;
Kahneman 2003, 2011). For example, Epstein (2003) postu-
lated two broad personality systems: experiential and rational
minds, each with different characteristics related to respective-
ly automated and controlled processing modes (Gawronski
and Creighton 2013). The experiential mind may work even
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without language and is based on currently experienced feel-
ings (Epstein 2003; Kahneman 2003). Such processing is au-
tomatic in nature (Bargh 1994; Gawronski and Creighton
2013; Moors and De Houwer 2006), based on associations
(Strack and Deutsch 2014), and is, thus, fast and prioritized
(Kahneman 2003). It appears without effort (Kahneman 2011)
and dominates everyday experience (Epstein 2003). The ex-
periential mind is responsible for giving a quick and approx-
imated response to the task an individual is facing (Kahneman
2011; Lieberman 2003). The rational mind is language cen-
tered (Epstein 2003), based on propositional mechanisms
(Strack and Deutsch 2014), and strictly follows the rules of
formal logic (Darlow and Sloman 2010; Epstein 2003;
Kahneman 2011). Such processing is controlled in nature (in
other words systematic or slow: Kahneman 2003), and is,
thus, less salient, because it consumes energy through effortful
operations required to achieve algorithmic answers to the
problem (Kahneman 2011). Answers given by a rational mind
are, in most cases, accurate and precise (Slovic et al. 2002;
Strack and Deutsch 2004), thus, these responses or choices are
best at any given time, but their creation costs a lot of energy
(Kahneman 2003). For that reason, systematic processing of
rational mind almost always appear after the simpler, automat-
ic processing guided by the experiential mind (Epstein 2003;
Kahneman 2011; Lieberman 2003), especially when the for-
mer fail to give a satisfactory answer or only when a situation
is important enough to bother ourselves.
Considering the role of experiential and rational minds in
information processing, we have to discuss the role of activa-
tion accompanying both minds (Imbir 2016a). The role of
activation is to provide energy that enhances processing spe-
cific to the requirements of the mental system engaged. In the
literature, there is a debate about the nature of activatingmech-
anisms, especially those guiding automatic and effortless pro-
cessing of experiential mind in comparison to those involved
with the controlled and effortful processing of rational mind
(c.f. Imbir 2015a, 2016a). Arousal is postulated to be the type
of activation (c.f. Epstein 2003; Osgood et al. 1957) specific to
the experiential mind (Epstein 2003; Imbir 2016a). Arousal is
defined as a level of energy associated with certain objects,
providing the opportunity to activate simple processes (often
physiological) in order to face the threat to life or to appeal to a
potential sexual partner. Such activation does not need lan-
guage to occur and often disrupts higher cognitive processes
like attentional control (Jefferies et al. 2008) or cognitive con-
trol in a modified Stroop Task (Imbir 2016b). Epstein (2003),
in his experiential vs. rational mindmodel, claimed that arous-
al is the factor that shifts the balance towards the experiential
mind. In other words, facing arousing objects, the experiential,
effortless processing is activated and drives our responses to
stimulation. The source of activation of the effortful and con-
trolled processing of the rational mind remains an open ques-
tion (Imbir 2016a), concerning the reasons for engaging in
such complex, and thus demanding, forms of processing
(Kahneman 2011). An attempt to solve this problem was the
introduction of the subjective significance concept (Imbir
2015a, 2016a) as a manifestation of rational mind activation
that can be easily measured with different types of stimuli
using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) scale (c.f. Imbir
2015a). In this approach, subjective significance is defined as
the Battitude toward an object that renders it important and
significant, thereby, meriting the investment of energy in ac-
curate systematic processing^ (Imbir 2016b, p. 2). Simply,
rational mind activation and the type of enhanced processing
have to be based on congruent mechanisms. Rational mind
processing is based on language, verbalization (Epstein
2003), and propositional mechanisms (Strack and Deutsch
2014), thus, rational mind activation needs to be based on
language related mechanisms, including appraising the impor-
tance of the situation (Imbir 2016a, 2016b). Subjective signif-
icance was found to be a property of stimuli that is indepen-
dent from arousal, in terms of low correlations between as-
sessments of these two dimensions made by participants in
affective norms studies (Imbir 2016c).
Warmth and Competence in Social Perception:
Model of Relations between Incidental Activation
and Ambiguous Stimuli Interpretation
Social psychology has identified that our social cognition and
social perception can mostly be accounted for by two dimen-
sions concerning how we judge other people: warmth and
competence (Fiske et al. 2007; Wojciszke 2005). Warmth rep-
resents socially related traits connected with wellbeing in
group functioning and personal contacts, while competence
represents ability related traits and attributes of people from
our social environment connected with effectiveness of task
realization. Studies found that both dimensions explains al-
most all the variance in favorability ratings (Wojciszke
2005), and a majority of variance in social perception, includ-
ing approach-–avoidance tendencies (Cacioppo et al. 1997;
Peeters 2002) or inferences about the motives of other people
(Reeder et al. 2002). It seems that warmth is a more prioritized
dimension when perceiving others (Fiske et al. 2007) because,
from an evolutionary point of view, it is more important to get
to know other people’s intentions (bad or good) than other
people’s abilities to realize those intentions. Subjects have
quicker reaction times for warmth related words compared
to competence related ones, when they were discriminated
from pseudo-words in the lexical decisions paradigm
(Ybarra et al. 2001). Moreover, very brief (100 ms) exposition
of faces allows one to formulate more reliable assessments of
trustworthiness (a trait linked with warmth) compared to com-
petence (Willis and Todorov 2006).
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This prioritization of warmth judgments over competence
assessments suggests that perception of the warmth of others
may be based on experiential mind processing mechanisms,
while competence perception of others may be related to ra-
tional mind processing (c.f. Epstein 2003; Kahneman 2011).
To check this intuition, the activational aspect of these two
types of process were taken into consideration, because the
activation specific to each mental system should trigger a spe-
cific mechanism of processing (Epstein 2003), and, thus, the
perception in terms of system specific dimension (c.f. Antosz
and Imbir 2016). Figure 1 present the theoretical predictions
concerning the relations between activation and social
perception.
The important issue is how to search for activation out-
comes for social perception, since most of known stimuli from
our social environment is already interpreted in the context of
warmth and competence. This question has been addressed
here using two different methodologies: incidental affect elic-
itation (c.f. Ferguson et al. 2005) and processing of ambiguous
objects (Antosz and Imbir 2016; Błaszczak and Imbir 2012).
Incidental affect is a term for affective reaction caused by
stimulation unrelated to the current task. Such an approach
allows for manipulating the affective state of individuals even
without the participants’ conscious recognition of changes
made, thus, measuring the incidental outcomes of affective
reactions occurring in everyday situations. Merely viewing
the stimuli (Russell 2003) should influence the actual affec-
tive state of individuals, in both valence and activation
dimensions (c.f. Ferguson et al. 2005; Imbir 2015b,
2016b). Incidental affect outcomes are also broadly dis-
tributed, including processes from food intake (Garg et al.
2007), through categorizations (Kenworthy et al. 2003)
and information acquisition (Lee and Sternthal 1999), to
social perception (Ferguson et al. 2005).
A good testing ground for associations between social per-
ception and duality of activationmay be specific types of tasks
involving ambiguity (Pauker et al. 2010), originally intro-
duced by Murphy and Zajonc (1993); see also Błaszczak
and Imbir 2012; Payne et al. 2005). When asking participants
about the meaning of stimuli unknown to them, such as graph-
ical signs derived from distant cultures (e.g. Chinese
ideograms or hexagrams), we may expect that the reaction
will be biased by the type of process primed. After suboptimal
presentation of faces expressing negative or positive emo-
tions, participants rated ideograms as referring to worse or
better objects respectively (Murphy and Zajonc 1993). Other
studies showed a tendency to relate hexagrams more to the
self when primed by positive faces and less to the self when
primed by negative faces (Błaszczak and Imbir 2012). Taking
the above into consideration, one may expect that am-
biguous stimuli, such as hexagrams (c.f. method section)
may be interpreted in different ways, due to priming
stimuli properties.
Aim and Hypothesis
The aim of the current studywas to test predictions concerning
activation mechanisms of experiential and rational mind sys-
tems, and their role in the interpretation of stimuli thought to
represent other people’s traits in terms of their warmth and
competence. To do so, ambiguous hexagram sign processing
was applied with superficially unrelated presentation of acti-
vation charged words. Arousal related words were expected to
promote perception in terms of warmth, due to eliciting expe-
riential mind mechanisms. Subjective significance was ex-
pected to promote perception in terms of competence, due to
eliciting rational mind mechanisms. The link between activa-
tion types and mind types was assumed to be crucial in ambi-
guity interpretation (Imbir 2016a). No specific expectations
were formulated for reaction latencies. The importance of
the study presented here is based on the approach focused
on searching for links between different dualities described
in the literature (of activation mechanisms or perceptions of
others), indicating that all of them are derivates of two more
general mind systems (experiential and rational: Epstein
2003). Such a claim may provide an opportunity to advance
the dual-mind theories and overcome their main weakness,
namely the multitude of dualities identified (c.f. Imbir
2016a; Keren & Schul 2009).
Method
Participants
The experiment involved 60 students (30 women and 30 men)
from differentWarsaw universities and colleges from a variety
of departments (biology, technology, linguistics, economics,
law etc.), aged from 19 to 27 years, with a mean of 21.48 years
(SD = 2.12 years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Participation was voluntary in nature and
rewarded by gift cards. Only Polish language native speakers
with no knowledge of Far East languages were invited to the
Fig. 1 Theoretical model of relation between activation mechanisms of
experiential and rational minds and interpretation of ambiguous stimuli in
terms of Warmth vs. Competence
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study. The sample size was determined in advance on the basis
of earlier studies (e.g. Imbir, 2015b, 2016b) as 60 participants.
The data collection was terminated when the sample size
reached the quota. The experimental protocol was approved
by an institutional ethical review board of Maria
Grzegorzewska Academy of Special Education and study
was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the
World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.
Linguistic Materials
The words were chosen as research materials in order to ma-
nipulate the activational properties of stimuli (arousal and
subjective significance). This choice was justified by the na-
ture of verbal materials; they all express objects and states
appearing in human world (Imbir, 2015a). Words were also
shown in previous studies to transmit activation (Imbir,
2015b, 2016b) even when they were presented as unrelated
or in addition to the main, explicit task. Words used in current
experiment were chosen from Affective Norms for Polish
Words Reload dataset (ANPW-R; Imbir, 2016c). Norms were
collected for a large number of items (4900 words) assessed
on eight different affective scales (with use of Self-
Assessment Manikin measures: Lang, 1980). Each dimension
was assessed by at least 50 (25 females) students from differ-
ent Warsaw universities (Appendix 1; see also: Imbir, 2015a,
2016b, 2016c). Only nouns were selected and divided into
nine groups of 15 words each. In each group the valence,
concreteness, length and frequency of appearance levels were
closely matched for each group (there were no significant
differences between groups’ items for each of controlled di-
mensions, c.f. Table 1). Hence, selected groups differed in
levels of arousal and subjective significance so as to form a
3 (arousal levels) × 3 (subjective significance levels) factorial
manipulation. The different levels of arousal and subjective
significance of words were selected from stimuli rated respec-
tively: below −1 SD (low intensity), from −0.5 to 0.5 SD
(moderate intensity), and above 1 SD (high intensity of acti-
vation property) from the average rating in the corresponding
dimension. Further, the selected words had medium ratings
(between −0.5 and 0.5 SD) for valence and for concreteness.
The selection procedure also ensured an equalization of the
frequency of appearance and length (NoL) of words.
Frequency estimations were based on online Polish texts
(Kazojć, 2011) and represented the number of occurrences
of each word in the whole database used. The distribution of
values in this database was right-skewed, but was corrected by
natural logarithm (LN) transformation enabling the applica-
tion of parametric statistics. Thus, all analyses were conducted
with use of the LN transformations of frequency estimation.
To ensure correct construction of the manipulation, 3
(arousal levels) × 3 (subjective significance levels) ANOVA
analyses were computed for each dimension measured.
Table 1 presents the pattern of obtained results. Table 2 pre-
sents the mean values (M) and standard deviations (SD) of
assessments for each manipulated group of words.
As one can see, the intended differences were found for
arousal dimension in groups differing in arousal levels and
subjective significance dimension in groups differing in sub-
jective significance levels. There was no statistically signifi-
cant difference between groups for valence, concreteness, LN
of frequency and length. The same list of words was used in an
earlier study concerning effects of arousal and subjective sig-
nificance on cognitive control in a modified Stroop task
(Imbir, 2016b).
Warmth Vs. Competence Ambiguous Task
To assess the impact of words’ activation level on social per-
ception in warmth vs. competence dimensions, an ambiguous
task was designed as a modification of a paradigm proposed
by Błaszczak and Imbir (2012). The idea is simple and orig-
inates from affective priming paradigm (Murphy & Zajonc,
1993). A sign unknown to the participants in the form of a
hexagram (see Fig. 2) was introduced as a pictorial represen-
tation of human character or personality trait. The task was to
guess by intuition the meaning of the presented sign and rate it
on a 5 point Likert scale described as varying from a
Table 1 Properties of the words used in the experiment. In bold, the expected main effects of arousal group for arousal ratings and effect of subjective
significance groups for subjective significance ratings are presented. Lack of effects for all of the other controlled dimensions suggest validity of the
material used
Dimension Main effect of Arousal
words groups
Main effect of Subjective Significance
words groups
Interaction of Arousal and Subjective
Significance groups
Arousal F(2126) = 298.47, p < 0.001, η2 = .83 F(2126) = .88, p = 0.4, η2 = .01 F(4126) = .3, p = 0.9, η2 = .009
Sub. Sign. F(2126) = 3.02, p = .053, η2 = .04 F(2126) = 263.05, p < .001, η2 = .81 F(4126) = .73, p = 0.6, η2 = .023
Valence F(2126) = 1.46, p = .23, η2 = .02 F(2126) = 1.89, p = .16, η2 = .03 F(4126) = .23, p = 0.9, η2 = .007
Concreteness F(2126) = .03, p = .97, η2 < 0.001 F(2126) = 2.74, p = .07, η2 = .04 F(4126) = .12, p = 0.9, η2 = .004
LN frequency F(2126) = 1.24, p = .29, η2 = .02 F(2126) = 2.99, p = .054, η2 = .05 F(4126) = .19, p = 0.95, η2 = .006
Length F(2126) = .57, p = .57, η2 = .01 F(2126) = 1.29, p = .28, η2 = .02 F(4126) = .19, p = 0.94, η2 = .006
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competence (1) to warmth (5) related term. The order of scale
ends presentation was always the same. Competence was
present at the beginning in order to minimize the effect of
prioritization of warmth processing found in earlier studies.
Although warmth and competence are thought to be rather
distinct dimensions (c.f. Wojciszke, 2005), for the purpose
of this study they were integrated into a single scale. At the
exploratory level of analysis, the main focus of participants’
interpretation was measured. In other words only the
dominating perspective at a given time could have been mea-
sured in this study. Both categories meanings were explained,
and the definitions were provided, thus participants knew
what this scale represented. Competence was defined as de-
scribing skills and abilities. Features related to competence
include people solving problems better, achieving better re-
sults. People who are competent were described as smarter
than others and able to rule over others. Warmth was defined
as the preference for relationships. Features related to warmth
were claimed to make people better in interacting with others
or on a team. People that are warm were described as having
better relationships, being more popular and attracting other
people to them. Reaction latencies and types of answers were
measured in a hexagram meaning guessing task.
Design and Apparatus
A 3 (arousal levels) × 3 (subjective significance levels) within-
subject design was used. The dependent variables were (a)
type of answer in hexagram interpretation task and (b) time
spent on hexagram interpretation on competence – warmth
Fig. 2 The single trial of ambiguous task comprised (1) presentation of
word charged with activation, (2) delay time for storing the word in
memory and (3) hexagram sign representing a personality trait rated on
a competence vs. warmth scale
Table 2 Descriptive statistics







Low Medium High Total
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Low Arousal 3.20 .29 3.84 .27 4.79 .53 3.94 .76
Sub. Sign. 2.87 .33 2.96 .18 2.93 .60 2.92 .40
Valence 5.25 .48 5.11 .44 5.01 .63 5.12 .52
Concreteness 4.07 1.02 3.88 .73 3.91 .90 3.95 .87
LN frequency 6.04 1.86 6.32 1.41 5.95 1.36 6.10 1.53
Length 5.73 2.09 6.20 1.32 6.07 2.02 6.00 1.81
Medium Arousal 3.20 .16 3.85 .26 4.85 .35 3.97 .73
Sub. Sign. 3.56 .32 3.71 .22 3.74 .34 3.67 .30
Valence 5.42 .47 5.38 .62 5.10 .66 5.30 .59
Concreteness 3.92 .90 3.94 .90 3.98 .75 3.95 .83
LN frequency 6.50 1.52 6.29 1.58 5.68 1.91 6.16 1.68
Length 6.27 2.09 6.13 1.68 6.87 2.45 6.42 2.07
High Arousal 3.27 .27 3.85 .32 4.97 .33 4.03 .78
Sub. Sign. 4.55 .31 4.64 .40 4.88 .44 4.69 .41
Valence 5.38 .36 5.41 .35 5.31 1.11 5.37 .69
Concreteness 4.28 .75 4.33 1.00 4.37 .98 4.33 .89
LN frequency 6.99 2.02 7.08 1.23 6.55 1.90 6.87 1.73
Length 6.47 2.13 6.67 1.95 6.87 2.00 6.67 1.99
Total Arousal 3.22 .24 3.85 .28 4.87 .41 3.98 .75
Sub. Sign. 3.66 .77 3.77 .75 3.85 .93 3.76 .82
Valence 5.35 .44 5.30 .49 5.14 .82 5.26 .61
Concreteness 4.09 .89 4.05 .88 4.09 .89 4.08 .88
LN frequency 6.51 1.81 6.56 1.43 6.06 1.74 6.38 1.67
Length 6.16 2.08 6.33 1.65 6.60 2.15 6.36 1.96
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scale. The whole experiment was fully randomized, thus
words from different categories and word-hexagram pairs
were displayed to the participants in a random fashion. A
standard 15 in. laptop computer was used in order to present
the experimental procedure. The session was prepared with
use of E-Prime 2.0 software.
Procedure
Participants were invited into the laboratory for individual
sessions lasting about 35 min. They were told that the study
focuses on the boundaries of human intuition seeking an an-
swer to whether the meaning of Far East culture signs can be
guessed despite the memory load. For that reason, the second
task was introduced as a brief (500 ms) presentation of words.
The additional task was to try to remember as much as possi-
ble all words that were presented during the experiment. For
remembering, there was an additional 500 ms after word pre-
sentation end in each trial.
Participants were comfortably seated in front of the com-
puter screen and then the experiment started. Participants were
instructed to place fingers of both hands over the marked
response keys (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) on a keyboard of a laptop
computer. The whole experiment was based on ambiguous
task procedure. Participants were encouraged to try to guess
meaning of signs originating from far-east cultures. No in-
struction was provided concerning speed of processing. The
single trial of this task entailed three events: (1) presentation of
word stimuli lasting 500 ms, (2) fixation point lasting 500 ms
and (3) hexagram sign presentation with accompanying an-
swering scale. The words were introduced as an additional
task designed to create the working memory load.Words were
displayed in a fully random order to avoid sequence effects.
Figure 2 presents a single trial of the ambiguous task used in
the current experiment.
The whole experiment had 270 trials of the ambiguous task
placed in two different blocks of 135 trials presented in ran-
dom order. One of these blocks is discussed in the current
manuscript. Another contained different lists of words focus-
ing on valence and origin of affective state differences and will
be discussed in another paper. Two blocks differed as well as
the type of ambiguous stimulus used, in order not to give
participants the chance to habituate to hexagrams. In the va-
lence block, the Japanese letter compounds were presented.
Was All 145 words in each block were presented in a random
order. Also ambiguous stimuli were displayed in a random
order. No effects of interference between both blocks were
found. After each session, the direct associations of words
with warmth-competence scale were assessed for each
participant with use of scale from main part of experi-
ment. Appendix 1 presents values of direct associations
for each word.
Data Treatment and Analytical Strategy
A total of 8100 trials from all 60 subjects were included in the
initial analysis. The first step was to inspect reaction latencies.
The initial mean reaction latencies was M = 2332 ms
(SD = 2963 ms), ranging from 8 ms to 70,662 ms. Data were
normalized and outliers, reaction latencies lower than 350 ms
(691 trials, set as a reasonable time needed to respond con-
sciously, Z < −1.42) or longer than 13,900 ms (87 trials,
Z > 2.3 was set as criterion), were excluded from further
consideration. Relatively weak restriction of long reaction la-
tency outliers was based on the assumption that decision mak-
ing in an ambiguous task is rather difficult, thus requiring
time. Reaction time for remaining trials were transformed by
ln, then all data (responses, reaction latencies and log trans-
formed reaction latencies) were aggregated across participants
and conditions. LN transformation is a standard procedure
for reaction time data to analyze a right-skewed (c.f.,
Heathcote, Popiel, & Mewhort, 1991) distribution using
parametric statistics.
Data were analyzed with a 3 (word arousal levels) × 3
(word subjective significance levels) within-subjects
ANOVA with repeated measures. The dependent variables
were type of answer chosen and log transformed reaction la-
tency, both measured in the warmth-competence hexagram
meaning guessing ambiguous task.
Results
Type of Answer in Hexagram Meaning Guessing
Results showed a statistically significant main effect of arousal
level for responses in warmth-competence dimension:
F(2,58) = 13.44, p = .001, η2 = 0.32. Simple contrast analysis
with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison showed
that mean responses differed between all level of arousal: low
arousing words condition (M = 2.87, SEM = .044) and medium
arousing words condition (M = 2.98, SEM = .047):
F(1,59) = 8.35, p = .016, η2 = 0.12; low arousing and high
arousing words (M = 3.13, SEM = .045): F(1,59) = 27.29,
p = .001, η2 = 0.32 and between medium and high arousing
words: F(1,59) = 22.99, p = .002, η2 = 0.28. Also the main
effect of the subjective significance factor was statistically sig-
nificant: F(2,58) = 35.31, p = .001, η2 = 0.55. Simple contrast
analysis with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison
showed that mean responses differed between all levels of sub-
jective significance: low subjective significant words condition
(M = 3.36, SEM = .061) and medium subjective significant
words condition (M = 3.09, SEM = .049): F(1,59) = 21.63,
p = .001, η2 = 0.27; low and high subjective significant words
(M = 2.53, SEM = .069): F(1,59) = 71.8, p = .001, η2 = 0.55 and
between medium and high subjective significant words:
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F(1,59) = 67.03, p = .001, η2 = 0.53. No statistically significant
interaction between arousal and subjective significance of
words used was found: F(4,56) = 2.06, p = .1, η2 = 0.13. The
pattern of results is shown in Fig. 3.
Reaction Latencies in Hexagram Meaning Guessing
In order to make the presentation of results clearer, results in the
text are presented in log transformation, but Fig. 4 shows data in
milliseconds (ms). ANOVA analysis for reaction latencies
showed a statistically significant main effect of arousal level
for responses in warmth-competence dimension:
F(2,58) = 3.53, p = .036, η2 = 0.11. Simple contrast analysis
with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison showed that
mean response latencies did not differ between: low arousing
words (log transformed data:M = 7.56, SEM = .074) and medi-
um arousing words (M = 7.53, SEM = .075): F(1,59) = 4.14,
p = .33, η2 = 0.042 and between medium and high arousing
words (M = 7.51, SEM = .074): F(1,59) = 2.61, p = .9,
η2= 0.066. The difference between low arousing and high arous-
ing words was statistically significant: F(1,59) = 6.93, p = .032,
η2 = 0.11. The main effect of the subjective significance factor
was also statistically significant: F(2,58) = 6.72, p = .002,
η2 = 0.19. Simple contrast analysis with Bonferroni correction
for multiple comparison showed that mean response latencies
differed between: low subjective significant words (M = 7.51,
SEM = .075) and medium subjective significant words
(M = 7.58, SEM = .072): F(1,59) = 12.89, p = .002, η2 = 0.18.
No statistically significant differences were found be-
tween medium vs. high (M = 7.52, SEM = .075) subjec-
tive significant words: F(1,59) = 1.38, p = .26, η2 = 0.023
and low vs. high subject ive signi f icant words:
F(1,59) = .64, p = .9, η2 = 0.01. No statistically signifi-
cant interaction between arousal and subjective signifi-
cance of words used was found: F(4,56) = 1.6, p = .19,
η2 = 0.1. The pattern of results is shown in Fig. 4.
Direct Associations between Words Meaning
and Warmth-Competence
In order to check the alternative explanation of results, direct
associations were analyzed with use of ANOVA. Assessments
were provided by each participant after main experiment for
each of word used. Results showed a no statistically signifi-
cant main effect of arousal level: F(2126) = 0.52, p = .6,
η 2 = 0 .008 , no r sub jec t ive s ign i f i cance l eve l :
F(2126) = 1.28, p = .28, η2 = 0.02 for direct associations in
warmth-competence. Also no statistically significant interac-























































Fig. 3 Mean responses in competence (1) vs. warmth (5) dimensions in
conditions differing in arousal and subjective significance levels of
















































Fig. 4 Mean response latencies (ms) in ambiguous competence-warmth
hexagrammatching task for conditions differing in arousal and subjective
significance levels of words. Error bars represents SEM
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used was found: F(4126) = .36, p = .8, η2 = 0.011. Mean
association was 2.82 with SD = .56.
Discussion
This study showed that perception of ambiguous objects is
susceptible to the activation included in words presented before
the task as an unrelated distractor. Arousal as an activational
mechanism of experiential mental processing was expected to
promote perception of hexagrams in terms of warmth, while
the opposite effect was expected for subjective significance,
which is claimed to be an activational mechanism for rational
mental processing, and which promoted perception of compe-
tence in ambiguous objects. Results confirmed these expecta-
tions. The more arousing the stimulus was, the more hexa-
grams were perceived as representing a warmth related trait.
A very similar, but opposite linear tendency could be seen for
subjective significance: the more subjectively significant
words were, the more hexagrams were perceived as related to
competence. This pattern of results supports the claim that the
experiential mind (Epstein, 2003) and arousal, as its activation
mechanism, are connected with warmth in social perception
(Fiske et al., 2007), while the rational mind and its activation
mechanism of subjective significance (Imbir, 2015a, 2016a)
are associated with competence in social perception. It is worth
highlighting that no direct associations for words used in the
experiment were found, thus, we may exclude semantic prim-
ing as a source of results (c.f. Payne et al., 2005).
Reaction latencies data showed that, in high arousing words
conditions, participants made their decision more quickly in
comparison to low arousing words. This effect can be explained
in two ways. Firstly, arousal was found to promote warmth
perception. Sincewarmth processingwas found to be prioritized
(Willis & Todorov, 2006; Ybarra et al., 2001), one may expect
such an effect. Secondly, the arousal level of words used could
be the optimal one, facilitating processing. It is worth noticing
that, due to the main aim to create a factorial design for arousal
and subjective significance manipulation with precise control
for valence and concreteness, the relative level of arousal in
words used was, in fact, moderate (4.87 in 9 point Likert
scale, c.f. Imbir, 2015a, 2016c). This could account for the
shortening of the reaction latencies observed here. Moreover,
trials after low subjective significance words were processed
quicker in comparison to those after medium subjective signif-
icant stimuli. One may predict that, since increasing levels of
subjective significance made the responses more competence
related, the use of more rational mental processing mechanisms
resulting in longer time needed to give the answer. From this
point of view, the results are understandable. Surprisingly, no
such effect was found for high subjective significance words.
This is probably due to the fact that the nature of the task used is
not quite relevant to the rational mind; there is no algorithmic
strategy to answer the question concerning hexagram meaning.
Earlier studies on word recognition (c.f. Kuperman, Estes,
Brysbaert, & Warriner, 2014) showed that increasing arousal
level cause the slowdown in word processing, namely in word
recognition latencies. Such results are congruent with studies
concerning effects of arousal on reaction latencies in emotional
Stroop test (c.f. Burt, 2002; Imbir, 2016b). In current experiment
the time spent on word stimuli processing was not measured,
although results of another studies involving incidental affect
elicitation by verbal stimuli of matched concreteness and fre-
quency of appearance (c.f. Antosz & Imbir, 2016) showed no
differences in reading times, but influence of incidental affect on
subsequent ambiguous task. The theoretical explanation for re-
versed effects of arousal for reaction latencies in paradigms in-
volving processing of arousing words themselves (e.g. Imbir,
2016b; Kuperman et al., 2014) and those focused on a conse-
quences of arousal on a subsequent task (c.f. incidental activa-
tion evoked in current study) may be that in first case increasing
arousal level may cause increase in a reaction latencies due to
paying more attention to arousing stimuli (such objects may be
related to life threats: c.f. Imbir, 2016a), while in the second case
activation caused by arousal may facilitate the processing char-
acteristic to experiential mind (Epstein, 2003; Imbir, 2016a).
Results of the study shows a great importance for understand-
ing the mental mechanisms that support the dual-mind perspec-
tive. The most important critique levelled at dual-mind theories
concerns the multitude of dualities postulated by different re-
searchers (c.f. Keren & Schul 2009) working in different fields.
This study aimed at searching for links between dualities of
different processes (c.f. Imbir, 2016a), in order to validate the
expectation that all of them are related to the more general du-
ality of experiential and rational mind postulated by Epstein
(2003). It seems that arousal and subjective significance are
distinct activation mechanisms that can trigger the perception
of ambiguous stimuli in terms of warmth and competence, re-
spectively, although no direct associations for stimuli meaning
were found in these two dimensions of social perception. This
opens a new field of research and suggests the need for change
to the most popular approach in dual-mind theories. Namely,
each existing dichotomy should be validated in the context of
its ability to evoke mind-system-specific processing in different
aspect of functioning. Such an approach was recently postulated
in a new model discussing the relations between emotional and
cognitive processes from the dual-mind perspective (Imbir,
2016a). Results of the current study lead us to the conclusion
that all of the dichotomies listed in introduction should be treated
as derivates of more general mind systems, rather than as distinct
concepts (Epstein, 2003; Imbir, 2016a; Kahneman, 2011).
The results of this study are also important for understand-
ing the perception of other people, within the field of social
psychology. First of all, warmth and competence dimensions
have not yet been discussed as emanations of dual-mind
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processes, therefore, further hypotheses for testing this idea in
experimental studies may be derived from the results of the
current study that supports this claim. In particular, when
warmth is related to the experiential mind, while competence
is related to the rational, then we should be able to observe not
only the prioritization of warmth assessments, but also other
characteristics of experiential mind processing, such as the
domination of associative thinking mechanisms in warmth
assessments (compared to cause and effects mechanisms in
the case of competence assessments) or lower ability to
change initial warmth assessments in comparison to easier
changes (perhaps labiality based on upcoming evidences) in
competence judgments (Epstein, 2003). All of the relation-
ships mentioned above are only hypothetical, however, they
seems to be worthy of further testing. Second of all, results of
this studymay shed new light on themechanisms of stereotype
creation or acquisition. To put it simply, changes of incidental
activation (Russell, 2003) may not be consciously perceived
by individuals, but they may influence the interpretation of
unfamiliar objects, including members of other social groups,
therefore, some instances for understanding the development
of stereotypes may be derived from the results of this study.
Limita t ions of the current s tudy includes the
operationalization of warmth and competence in a single
scale, instead of two distinct dimensions. In fact, this only
allowed for concluding that a general tendency in social per-
ception occurs after contact with activation charged words, but
nothing could be said about the dynamic of perception in both
dimensions. It is possible that the domination of a single di-
mension can be observed when the second dimension is
overwhelmed, but still active, when judging. This limitation
should be addressed in subsequent studies. Furthermore, it is
worth searching for the relations postulated in previous para-
graph among fundamental dimensions of social cognition,
derived from experiential and rational mind models (Epstein,
2003). Lastly, an important issue worth investigating is the
role of valence, which often accompanies activation (c.f. core
affect concept: Russell, 2003), and that may influence the
relationship described above.
In conclusion, it is worth highlighting that the current study
demonstrated the susceptibility of social perception to inci-
dental activation. Reading and remembering words charged
with activation influenced the perception of ambiguous stim-
uli. The same effect should be present in other domains of
social perception. Everyday experience is full of occasions
when incidental affect can influence our current state
(Ferguson et al., 2005; Russell, 2003), thus, our judgments
towards other people or objects may be biased by the nature
of activation accompanying the situation. Another important
aspect of this experiment concerns the successful attempt to
operationalize rational mind activation (Imbir, 2015a), which
can be transmitted and alter the subsequent judgments of un-
known objects.
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